Incumbency and distributive politics: intergovernmental transfers in Mexico

Andrew Abbott, Rene Cabral, Philip Jones

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (SciVal)
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In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re-election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.
Original languageEnglish
Article number12226
Pages (from-to)484-503
JournalSouthern Economic Journal
Issue number2
Early online date24 Jul 2017
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2017


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