Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Ning Chen; Xiaotie Deng; Hongyang Zhang; Jie Zhang

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Hongyang Zhang, Jie Zhang

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceeding › Chapter in a published conference proceeding

28 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Automata, Languages, and Programming
Editors	A. Czumaj, K. Melhorn, A. Pitts, R. Wattenhofer
Publisher	Springer
Pages	464-475
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-31584-8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42
Publication status	Published - 2012

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer

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10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

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title = "Incentive ratios of Fisher markets",

abstract = "In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.",

author = "Ning Chen and Xiaotie Deng and Hongyang Zhang and Jie Zhang",

note = "International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP ; Conference date: 09-07-2012 Through 13-07-2012",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42",

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T1 - Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

AU - Chen, Ning

AU - Deng, Xiaotie

AU - Zhang, Hongyang

AU - Zhang, Jie

N1 - International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP ; Conference date: 09-07-2012 Through 13-07-2012

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.

AB - In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42

M3 - Chapter in a published conference proceeding

SN - 978-3-642-31584-8

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 464

EP - 475

BT - Automata, Languages, and Programming

A2 - Czumaj, A.

A2 - Melhorn, K.

A2 - Pitts, A.

A2 - Wattenhofer, R.

PB - Springer

ER -

Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

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