Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Hongyang Zhang, Jie Zhang

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceedingChapter in a published conference proceeding

30 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAutomata, Languages, and Programming
EditorsA. Czumaj, K. Melhorn, A. Pitts, R. Wattenhofer
PublisherSpringer
Pages464-475
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-31584-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer

Bibliographical note

International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, ICALP ; Conference date: 09-07-2012 Through 13-07-2012

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