Impure Altruism or Inequality Aversion?: An Experimental Investigation Based on Income Effects

Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Joo Young Jeon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequality aversion theories predict either no effect or a decrease in giving, whereas impure altruism theory predicts an increase in giving with an increase in the common income of donor and receiver. Theoretical predictions being contradictory, we run a dictator game in which we vary the common show-up fee of both the dictator and the recipient, while keeping an extra amount to be shared the same. The results are in line with the prediction of the impure altruism theory.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)143-150
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume118
Early online date14 Jul 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2014

Keywords

  • Alturism
  • Dictator-game
  • Income effect
  • Impure alturism
  • Inequality aversion

Cite this

Impure Altruism or Inequality Aversion?: An Experimental Investigation Based on Income Effects. / Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Jeon, Joo Young.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 118, 01.10.2014, p. 143-150.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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