Abstract
Most countries introduced loan guarantee schemes in the Covid-19 pandemic, and the UK offered two schemes. The BBL scheme had a cap of £50,000, a 100 % guarantee, and a fixed interest rate of 2.5 %. The CBILS scheme had a cap of £5 m, an 80 % guarantee and lenders set interest rates. We exploit a behavioural anomaly that led to 9,989 firms taking a CBILS loan for a cash amount below the BBL loan cap. Larger and older firms were more likely to be in this loan class and this is caused by lender sorting of firms by risk.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Finance Research Letters |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue number | B |
| Early online date | 14 Jul 2024 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2024 |
Data Availability Statement
The authors do not have permission to share data.Fingerprint
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