How does a small firm end up with a more expensive loan guarantee when a cheaper and safer one was on offer? The intriguing case of two UK Covid-19 guarantee schemes

Marc Cowling, Nicholas Wilson, Weixi Liu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Most countries introduced loan guarantee schemes in the Covid-19 pandemic, and the UK offered two schemes. The BBL scheme had a cap of £50,000, a 100 % guarantee, and a fixed interest rate of 2.5 %. The CBILS scheme had a cap of £5 m, an 80 % guarantee and lenders set interest rates. We exploit a behavioural anomaly that led to 9,989 firms taking a CBILS loan for a cash amount below the BBL loan cap. Larger and older firms were more likely to be in this loan class and this is caused by lender sorting of firms by risk.
Original languageEnglish
JournalFinance Research Letters
Volume67
Issue numberB
Early online date14 Jul 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2024

Data Availability Statement

The authors do not have permission to share data.

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