Hotelling-Downs competition when voters have an option to contest

Marcin Dziubinski, Jaideep Roy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Osborne shows that for almost all distributions of voters’preferences, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not existin the classical Hotelling–Downs model of electoral compe-tition with free entry. We show that equilibrium is gener-ically possible if in addition one allows voters an optionto announce their candidacy to compete side-by-side withoffice-seeking players. The model studied in this paper ren-ders Osborne and the celebrated citizen-candidate model`alaOsborne and Slivinski as two extreme cases. We char-acterize the equilibrium set with two central questions: (i)can there be equilibria where only voters contest? and (ii)are equilibria with contesting office-seeking players possi-ble? We also show that in our general setting, extremists aretypically voter-candidates so that in every two-party contest,office-seeking politicians stay out of competition.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)620-653
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2013

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candidacy
politician
voter
Voters
Contests
Hotelling
citizen
Free entry
Citizen-candidate
Politicians
Vote
Pure strategy Nash equilibrium

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Hotelling-Downs competition when voters have an option to contest. / Dziubinski, Marcin; Roy, Jaideep.

In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 15, No. 4, 01.08.2013, p. 620-653.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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