Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Jay Pil Choi, Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Jaesoo Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • 3 Citations

Abstract

We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group-conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.
LanguageEnglish
Pages816-840
JournalScandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume118
Issue number4
Early online date27 Oct 2015
DOIs
StatusPublished - 22 Apr 2016

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Internal conflict
Asymmetry
Contests
Complementarity
Intergroup
Rent dissipation

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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry. / Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo.

In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 4, 22.04.2016, p. 816-840.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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