Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Jay Pil Choi, Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Jaesoo Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)
45 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We investigate simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflict in the shadow of within-group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' group-conflict efforts. A more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict, and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group-conflict effort technology is highly complementary. Depending on the degree of complementarity, the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and, as a result, it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff. In the absence of any complementarity, the rent-dissipation is non-monotonic with the within-group power asymmetry.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)816-840
JournalThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume118
Issue number4
Early online date27 Oct 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 22 Apr 2016

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