Abstract
The more that health care expenditures are financed by general taxation, the greater the discretion governments are likely to exercise when timing increases in health care expenditures. Vote-maximising governments time increases in health care expenditures to occur in economic upturns, when voters are not as aware of the required increase in taxation. In recessions, they have an incentive to sustain expenditures on health care by diverting expenditures from other public expenditure programmes that voters perceive as low priority. In this way, government pursuit of a political agenda is likely to exert a systematic influence on the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are tested with reference to the cyclicality of government health expenditures, for a sample of OECD countries from 2000 to 2012.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | 101988 |
Journal | European Journal of Political Economy |
Volume | 68 |
Early online date | 5 Dec 2020 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Jun 2021 |
Funding
The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments and encouragement from the Editor, three anonymous reviewers and Richard Wagner. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. If there are any errors, they are the sole responsibility of the authors.
Keywords
- Business cycles
- Fiscal illusion
- Health care
- Voracity effects
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations