This article explores the existence and endogeneity of gender differences in strategic behaviour. We report results from two experimental studies employing the beauty contest game, one in the laboratory and one in the classroom. We observe robust and significant gender differences in observed depth of strategic reasoning in favour of men in zero‐stake situations. These differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. We also find that females engage in more rounds of reasoning than males when gender and stereotypes are made salient. This effect of priming is driven by females who believe women are superior in the game.
|Number of pages||29|
|Journal||The Economic journal|
|Early online date||24 May 2017|
|Publication status||Published - 31 May 2017|
FingerprintDive into the research topics of 'Gender differences and stereotypes in strategic reasoning'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
- Department of Economics - Senior Lecturer
- Economic Theory
Person: Research & Teaching