Abstract
We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design and symmetric contestants. The goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows that optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest) form an equilibrium in the model with competition among contests. Under a very natural assumption these contests are in fact dominant, and the equilibria that they form are unique. Moreover, equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even in cases where other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 |
| Editors | Brian Williams, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Neville |
| Place of Publication | U. S. A. |
| Publisher | AAAI Press |
| Pages | 5608-5615 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781577358800 |
| Publication status | Published - 27 Jun 2023 |
| Event | 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 - Washington, USA United States Duration: 7 Feb 2023 → 14 Feb 2023 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 |
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| Volume | 37 |
Conference
| Conference | 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 |
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| Country/Territory | USA United States |
| City | Washington |
| Period | 7/02/23 → 14/02/23 |
Funding
This work was partially supported by the NSFC-ISF joint research program (grant No. NSFC-ISF 61761146005). Yotam Gafni was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant No. 740435).
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence