Focal points in tacit bargaining problems

Experimental evidence

Andrea Isoni, Anders Poulsen, Robert Sugden, Kei Tsutsui

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)
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Abstract

We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues which define relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling's hypotheses, we find that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efficiency even in games where there is no efficient and equal division, and induces systematically unequal payoff distributions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)167-188
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Volume59
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2013

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Bargaining problem
Experimental design
Hypothesis test

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Focal points in tacit bargaining problems : Experimental evidence. / Isoni, Andrea; Poulsen, Anders; Sugden, Robert; Tsutsui, Kei.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 59, 01.04.2013, p. 167-188.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Isoni, Andrea ; Poulsen, Anders ; Sugden, Robert ; Tsutsui, Kei. / Focal points in tacit bargaining problems : Experimental evidence. In: European Economic Review. 2013 ; Vol. 59. pp. 167-188.
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