We consider the combined impact of agency problems and behavioural factors on venture capital/entrepreneur contracting and performance. Particularly, we develop a behavioural game-theoretic model in which a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur negotiate over their respective equity shares, and then exert value-adding efforts in running the business. Double-sided moral hazard exists in that both parties may exert sub-optimal effort (the =shirking' problem). We demonstrate that, for a given level of VC-ability, an increase in social fairness norms induces the VC to offer more equity to the entrepreneur, which in turn induces the entrepreneur to exert more effort. This improves venture performance.
|Title of host publication||Entrepreneurship|
|Subtitle of host publication||Motivation, Performance and Risk|
|Publisher||Nova Science Publishers|
|Number of pages||18|
|Publication status||Published - Dec 2011|
Fairchild, R. (2011). Fairness norms and self-interest in venture capital/entrepreneur contracting and performance. In Entrepreneurship: Motivation, Performance and Risk (pp. 73-90). Nova Science Publishers.