Environmental crime and punishment: Empirical evidence from the German penal code

Christian Almer, Timo Goeschl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

U.S. and E.U. environmental policy employ criminal sanctions to enforce compliance. Recent moves toward revising their use are based on little empirical evidence as to their effectiveness. This paper exploits a unique dataset to study the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement. The dynamic panel data analysis leads to three findings. First, criminal sanctions do provide the intended deterrent effects. Second, standing trial provides one of the most significant deterrents, rather than the probability of conviction or the magnitude of fines. Third, public preferences regarding environmental quality and political economy variables affect reported environmental crime.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)707-726
JournalLand Economics
Volume86
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2010

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sanction
panel data
political economy
environmental quality
environmental policy
compliance
environmental crime
deterrent
code
Punishment
Crime
Empirical evidence
effect
Sanctions
data analysis
trial
enforcement
public
Dynamic panel data
Environmental quality

Cite this

Environmental crime and punishment: Empirical evidence from the German penal code. / Almer, Christian; Goeschl, Timo.

In: Land Economics, Vol. 86, No. 4, 01.11.2010, p. 707-726.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Almer, Christian ; Goeschl, Timo. / Environmental crime and punishment: Empirical evidence from the German penal code. In: Land Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 86, No. 4. pp. 707-726.
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