Electoral politics over automation in a dual economy

When automation in a developing economy displaces low-skilled workers in the advanced sector, backward sector wages may fall due to in-migration of the ‘newly’ unemployed. Fear of job and income loss may then induce office-seeking political parties to announce regulatory policies on automation for electoral success. We show that absent sectoral spillover, democratic adoption of automation is relatively higher and protects only high-skilled jobs in the advanced sector. However, the possibility of spillover limits this adoption. More specifically, if the backward sector is large, automation faces full resistance. In contrast, if the advanced sector is large, automation is moderate, making only the low-skilled jobs vulnerable. But these vulnerable workers, unlike their counterparts in the backward sector, may prefer automation because their advanced-sector wages fall below the severance pay plus backward-sector opportunities. When neither sector is large, the size of automation becomes uncertain, pushing similar economies into different growth paths.