Edge Manipulations for the Maximum Vertex-Weighted Bipartite b-matching

In this article, we explore the Mechanism Design aspects of the Maximum Vertex-Weighted -matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs . The set comprises agents, while represents tasks. The set , which connects and , is the private information of either agents or tasks. In this framework, we investigate three mechanisms - , , and . We examine scenarios in which either agents or tasks are strategic and report their adjacent edges to one of the three mechanisms. In both cases, we assume that the strategic entities are bounded by their statements: They can hide edges, but they cannot report edges that do not exist. First, we consider the case in which agents can manipulate. In this framework, and are optimal but not truthful. By characterizing the Nash Equilibria induced by and , we reveal that both mechanisms have a Price of Anarchy () and Price of Stability () of . These efficiency guarantees are tight; no deterministic mechanism can achieve a lower or . In contrast, the third mechanism, , is not optimal, but truthful and its approximation ratio is . We demonstrate that this ratio is optimal; no deterministic and truthful mechanism can outperform it. We then shift our focus to scenarios where tasks can exhibit strategic behavior. In this case, , , and all maintain truthfulness, making and truthful and optimal mechanisms. In conclusion, we investigate the manipulability of and through experiments on randomly generated graphs. We observe that (i) is less prone to be manipulated by the first agent than , and (ii) is more manipulable on instances in which the total capacity of the agents is equal to the number of tasks.