Abstract
This study examines the link between formally scheduled board meetings and profitability and solvency in the United Kingdom's (UK) property-casualty insurance industry. A panel data design using 83 UK insurers writing property-casualty insurance for the period 2004/5 to 2013/4 is employed. The study finds that increasing the number of board meetings scheduled each year enhances overall rates of attendance. However, outside directors with financial experience have relatively better attendance rates than their counterparts with less technical expertise. The study also finds that overall board meeting attendance, and directorate turn-out at strategy and remuneration meetings, improve profitability, but not solvency. In addition, board meeting attendance by outside directors falls when prior period profitability is sound suggesting a 'complacency-effect' among non-executives. The insignificance between total and outside director attendance and solvency also hints at a 'dependency-effect', whereby boards become reliant on professional managers (actuarial technocrats) in order to optimize financial strength and condition. Our results could have implications for insurers and regulators in deciding on the suitability of candidates applying for board-level positions.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation |
Publication status | Acceptance date - 7 Dec 2024 |