### Abstract

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 3--25 |

Number of pages | 23 |

Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |

Volume | 20 |

Publication status | Published - Jan 2003 |

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**Distribution of Coalitional Power in Randomized Multi-Valued Social Choice.** / Nandeibam, S.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Social Choice and Welfare*, vol. 20, pp. 3--25.

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Distribution of Coalitional Power in Randomized Multi-Valued Social Choice

AU - Nandeibam, S

PY - 2003/1

Y1 - 2003/1

N2 - This paper considers the distribution of coalitional influence under probabilistic social choice functions which are randomized social choice rules that allow social indifference by mapping each combination of a preference profile and a feasible set to a social choice lottery over all possible choice sets from the feasible set. When there are at least four alternatives in the universal set and ex-post Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and regularity are imposed, we show that: (i) there is a system of additive coalitional weights such that the weight of each coalition is its power to be decisive in every two-alternative feasble set; and (ii) for each combination of a feasible proper subset of the universal set and a preference profile, the society can be partioned in such a way that for each coalition in this partition, the probability of society's choice set being contained in the union of the best sets of its members is equal to the coalition's power or weight. It is further shown that, for feasible proper subsets of the universal set, the probability of society's choice set containing a pair of alternatives that are not jointly present in anyone's best set is zero. Our results remain valid even when the universal set itself becomes feasible provided some additional conditions hold.

AB - This paper considers the distribution of coalitional influence under probabilistic social choice functions which are randomized social choice rules that allow social indifference by mapping each combination of a preference profile and a feasible set to a social choice lottery over all possible choice sets from the feasible set. When there are at least four alternatives in the universal set and ex-post Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and regularity are imposed, we show that: (i) there is a system of additive coalitional weights such that the weight of each coalition is its power to be decisive in every two-alternative feasble set; and (ii) for each combination of a feasible proper subset of the universal set and a preference profile, the society can be partioned in such a way that for each coalition in this partition, the probability of society's choice set being contained in the union of the best sets of its members is equal to the coalition's power or weight. It is further shown that, for feasible proper subsets of the universal set, the probability of society's choice set containing a pair of alternatives that are not jointly present in anyone's best set is zero. Our results remain valid even when the universal set itself becomes feasible provided some additional conditions hold.

M3 - Article

VL - 20

SP - 3

EP - 25

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

ER -