Distributed Coordination of Flexible Loads using Locational Marginal Prices

Xuan Gong, Antonio De Paola, David Angeli, Goran Strbac

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1 Citation (Scopus)
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Abstract

This paper presents a novel distributed control strategy for large-scale deployment of flexible demand in power systems. A game theoretical setting is adopted, modeling the loads as rational players that aim to complete an assigned task at minimum cost and compete for power consumption at the cheapest hours of the day. The main novelty is the analysis of power systems with congestion: the proposed modeling framework envisages heterogeneous groups of loads that operate at different buses, connected by transmission lines of limited capacity. The locational marginal prices of electricity, different in general for each bus, are calculated through an optimal power flow problem, accounting for the impact of the flexible devices on power demand and generation. A new iterative scheme for flexible demand coordination is analytically characterized as a multivalued mapping. Its convergence to a stable market configuration (i.e., variational Wardrop equilibrium) and global optimality are analytically demonstrated, for any penetration level of flexible demand and any grid topology. Distributed implementations of the proposed control strategy are discussed, evaluating their performance with simulations on the IEEE 24-bus system.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1097-1110
Number of pages14
JournalIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Volume6
Issue number3
Early online date3 Jun 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2019

Keywords

  • Distributed control
  • flexible demand
  • game theory
  • locational marginal prices (LMPs)
  • transmission network

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Optimization

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