Dispute Resolution by Means of Peace Negotiation

Negotiation is at the core of dispute resolution in conflict. Through compromises, conflicting parties are expected to arrive at terms of peace that are not only acceptable to all but also reflect the realities of each negotiator's relative bargaining leverage. According to formal models of bargaining, negotiation among rational agents always results in a negotiated solution, as any alternative would entail costs and destruction for all negotiating parties. However, negotiations do fail, and conflicts either erupt or persist. This chapter analyses the game-theoretical logic of negotiation, employing classical bargaining models by Frederik Zeuthen, John Nash, and John Harsanyi. It elucidates how the manipulation of the game structure's appearance to the opponent, coupled with disagreements on the game's configuration, can sometimes lead to conflicts. Conflicts, then, manifest as a form of meta-bargaining, wherein conflicting parties demonstrate their commitments to specific bargaining settings.