Cybersecurity Education and Formal Methods

James H. Davenport; Tom Crick

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-71374-4_8

Cybersecurity Education and Formal Methods

Swansea University

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceeding › Chapter in a published conference proceeding

4 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

Formal methods have been largely thought of in the context of safety-critical systems, where they have achieved major acceptance. Tens of millions of people trust their lives every day to such systems, based on formal proofs rather than “we haven’t found a bug” (yet!); but why is “we haven’t found a bug” an acceptable basis for systems trusted with hundreds of millions of people’s personal data? This paper looks at some of these issues in cybersecurity, and the extent to which formal methods, ranging from “fully verified” to better tool support, could help. More importantly, recent policy reports and curricula initiatives appear to recommended formal methods in the limited context of “safety critical applications”; we suggest this is too limited in scope and ambition. Not only are formal methods needed in cybersecurity, the repeated and very public weaknesses of the cybersecurity industry provide a powerful motivation for formal methods.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Formal Methods – Fun for Everybody - First International Workshop, FMFun 2019, Revised Selected Papers
Editors	Antonio Cerone, Markus Roggenbach
Place of Publication	Cham, Switzerland
Publisher	Springer
Pages	159-172
Number of pages	14
ISBN (Print)	9783030713737
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71374-4_8
Publication status	Published - 11 Mar 2021
Event	1st International Workshop on Formal Methods - Fun for Everybody, FMFun 2019 - Bergen, Norway Duration: 2 Dec 2019 → 3 Dec 2019

Publication series

Name	Communications in Computer and Information Science
Volume	1301 CCIS
ISSN (Print)	1865-0929
ISSN (Electronic)	1865-0937

Conference

Conference	1st International Workshop on Formal Methods - Fun for Everybody, FMFun 2019
Country/Territory	Norway
City	Bergen
Period	2/12/19 → 3/12/19

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Curricula
Cybersecurity
Formal methods

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Computer Science
General Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-71374-4_8

https://cronfa.swansea.ac.uk/Record/cronfa55027

Cite this

Cybersecurity Education and Formal Methods. / Davenport, James H.; Crick, Tom.
Formal Methods – Fun for Everybody - First International Workshop, FMFun 2019, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Antonio Cerone; Markus Roggenbach. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2021. p. 159-172 (Communications in Computer and Information Science; Vol. 1301 CCIS).

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceeding › Chapter in a published conference proceeding

Davenport, JH & Crick, T 2021, Cybersecurity Education and Formal Methods. in A Cerone & M Roggenbach (eds), Formal Methods – Fun for Everybody - First International Workshop, FMFun 2019, Revised Selected Papers. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol. 1301 CCIS, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, pp. 159-172, 1st International Workshop on Formal Methods - Fun for Everybody, FMFun 2019, Bergen, Norway, 2/12/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71374-4_8

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Cybersecurity Education and Formal Methods

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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