Corruption and Military Expenditure: At 'No Cost to the King'

John Hudson, Philip Jones

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyse the determinants of the number of military personnel, military expenditure and arms imports using a panel data of all available countries with data from 1984-2006. The number of military personnel increases with the extent of external threat and with conscription. There is evidence for both economies of scale and the existence of 'ghost soldiers'. Expenditure, given the number of military personnel, increases with the extent of internal threat and the area of the country. Arms imports increase with the extent of external threat, GDP per capita and corruption. Finally, both arms imports and military expenditure impact upon corruption.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)387-403
Number of pages17
JournalDefence and Peace Economics
Volume19
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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corruption
expenditures
Military
import
costs
personnel
threat
soldier
Threat
Military expenditure
Corruption
Personnel
Import
Costs
determinants
economy
evidence
Panel data
Conscription
Economies of scale

Keywords

  • Defence
  • Corruption
  • Bureaucrats

Cite this

Corruption and Military Expenditure: At 'No Cost to the King'. / Hudson, John; Jones, Philip.

In: Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2008, p. 387-403.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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