Corporate visibility and executive pay

Bruce A. Rayton, Stephen Brammer, Suwina Cheng

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Abstract

This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-339
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume117
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2012

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Executive pay
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Corporate visibility and executive pay. / Rayton, Bruce A.; Brammer, Stephen; Cheng, Suwina.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 117, No. 1, 01.10.2012, p. 337-339.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Rayton, Bruce A. ; Brammer, Stephen ; Cheng, Suwina. / Corporate visibility and executive pay. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 117, No. 1. pp. 337-339.
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