Corporate visibility and executive pay

Bruce A. Rayton; Stephen Brammer; Suwina Cheng

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044

Corporate visibility and executive pay

Bruce A. Rayton, Stephen Brammer, Suwina Cheng

Management

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Abstract

This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	337-339
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	117
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2012

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AB - This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.

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Corporate visibility and executive pay

Abstract

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