Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching

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Abstract

We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisonerʼs Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair in which both parties cooperate repeat partner next period, while all other players are randomly matched into pairs. Under certain conditions, this rematching mechanism makes cooperation the unique outcome in the long run. Furthermore, we show that if imitation happens infrequently enough then cooperative behavior is always present in the population
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)148-162
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume79
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2013

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Imitation
Initial conditions
Novelty
Random matching
Cooperative behavior

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Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching. / Rivas, Javier.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 79, No. 1, 05.2013, p. 148-162.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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