Conflict networks

Jorg Franke, Tahir Öztürk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • 5 Citations

Abstract

Conflict parties are frequently involved in more than one conflict simultaneously. In this paper the structure of local conflicts is modeled as a conflict network where rivals invest in conflict specific technology to attack their respective neighbors. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium and examine the relation between total conflict investment (a proxy for conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. We also identify a class of conflict networks where peaceful conflict resolution is beneficial in the sense that conflict intensity is reduced. Outside of this class peaceful conflict resolution may be detrimental because countervailing local network effects can actually result in higher conflict intensity.

LanguageEnglish
Pages104-113
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume126
DOIs
StatusPublished - 1 Jun 2015

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Conflict resolution
Local network
Attack
Network effects

Keywords

  • C72
  • Conflict resolution
  • Conflicts
  • D74
  • D85
  • Network games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Conflict networks. / Franke, Jorg; Öztürk, Tahir.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 126, 01.06.2015, p. 104-113.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Franke J, Öztürk T. Conflict networks. Journal of Public Economics. 2015 Jun 1;126:104-113. Available from, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.04.002
Franke, Jorg ; Öztürk, Tahir. / Conflict networks. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 126. pp. 104-113
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