Concession Bargaining

An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons

Federica Alberti, Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, Kei Tsutsui

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol, no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differs across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2017-2039
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Volume62
Issue number9
Early online date31 Jul 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2018

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Keywords

  • Concession bargaining
  • Dynamic interaction
  • Emotion
  • Deadline
  • Conflict
  • Experiment

Cite this

Concession Bargaining : An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons. / Alberti, Federica; Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Tsutsui, Kei.

In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 62, No. 9, 01.10.2018, p. 2017-2039.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Alberti, Federica ; Fischer, Sven ; Güth, Werner ; Tsutsui, Kei. / Concession Bargaining : An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2018 ; Vol. 62, No. 9. pp. 2017-2039.
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