Comparative performance evaluation

quality

Eleonora Fichera, Silviya Nikolova, Matt Sutton

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The main challenge for patients and payers is the principal–agent problem caused by the asymmetry of information on the provider's efforts. This is particularly acute in the case of quality. The agent must specify incentives for providers to deliver quality and can do so using various forms of comparative performance evaluation. A key choice is the comparator, which could be the agent's own historical performance or the historical or contemporaneous performance of other agents. In practice, payers have steadily increased their use of comparative performance evaluation. Initially this focused on appealing to intrinsic motivation. Later attempts to link comparative performance evaluation to financial incentives have highlighted the uncertainties of the evidence base.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEncyclopedia of Health Economics
EditorsA. J. Culyer
Place of PublicationSan Diego, U. S. A.
PublisherElsevier
Pages111-116
ISBN (Print)9780123756787
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014

Fingerprint

Performance evaluation
Principal-agent problem
Financial incentives
Incentives
Uncertainty
Intrinsic motivation
Asymmetry of information

Cite this

Fichera, E., Nikolova, S., & Sutton, M. (2014). Comparative performance evaluation: quality. In A. J. Culyer (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Health Economics (pp. 111-116). San Diego, U. S. A.: Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375678-7.01313-4

Comparative performance evaluation : quality. / Fichera, Eleonora; Nikolova, Silviya; Sutton, Matt .

Encyclopedia of Health Economics. ed. / A. J. Culyer. San Diego, U. S. A. : Elsevier, 2014. p. 111-116.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Fichera, E, Nikolova, S & Sutton, M 2014, Comparative performance evaluation: quality. in AJ Culyer (ed.), Encyclopedia of Health Economics. Elsevier, San Diego, U. S. A., pp. 111-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375678-7.01313-4
Fichera E, Nikolova S, Sutton M. Comparative performance evaluation: quality. In Culyer AJ, editor, Encyclopedia of Health Economics. San Diego, U. S. A.: Elsevier. 2014. p. 111-116 https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-375678-7.01313-4
Fichera, Eleonora ; Nikolova, Silviya ; Sutton, Matt . / Comparative performance evaluation : quality. Encyclopedia of Health Economics. editor / A. J. Culyer. San Diego, U. S. A. : Elsevier, 2014. pp. 111-116
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