Committees with leaks

Saptarshi Ghosh, Jaideep Roy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are ‘leaked’ with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)207-214
Number of pages8
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume90
Early online date25 Feb 2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2015

Keywords

  • Leakage
  • career concerns
  • informative voting
  • welfare

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