Abstract
Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. 'Large' allies are exploited by 'small' allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that 'exploitation' increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 319-32 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Public Choice |
| Volume | 132 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Keywords
- Rent-seeking
- and Voting Behavior (D720)
- Elections
- Models of Political Processes
- National Security and War (H560)
- Legislatures
- International Organizations (F530)
- International Agreements and Observance