@techreport{5d306042443f4333b8844b99f74633c0,
title = "Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game",
abstract = "We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (publicgood) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement.We show that adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements,associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causesmitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strate-gic substitutes but complements. Thus, the fear that adaptation willreduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwar-ranted. We argue that our results extend to many important public goods. The purchase of private goods may not crowd out the provision of public goods, as this is commonly believed.",
author = "Basak Bayramoglu and Michael Finus and Jean-Francois Jaques",
note = "Working paper no. 51/16",
year = "2016",
month = jul,
day = "18",
language = "English",
series = "Bath Economics Research Working Papers",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Bath",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Bath",
}