Abstract

We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (publicgood) and adaptation (private good) strategies in a climate agreement.We show that adaptation can lead to larger self-enforcing agreements,associated with higher global mitigation levels and welfare if it causesmitigation levels between different countries to be no longer strate-gic substitutes but complements. Thus, the fear that adaptation willreduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may be unwar-ranted. We argue that our results extend to many important public goods. The purchase of private goods may not crowd out the provision of public goods, as this is commonly believed.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationBath, U. K.
PublisherDepartment of Economics, University of Bath
Publication statusPublished - 18 Jul 2016

Publication series

NameBath Economics Research Working Papers
Volume51/16

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Bayramoglu, B., Finus, M., & Jaques, J-F. (2016). Climate Agreements in a Mitigation-Adaptation Game. (Bath Economics Research Working Papers; Vol. 51/16). Department of Economics, University of Bath.