Choice logic programs and Nash equilibria in strategic games

Marina De Vos, Dirk Vermeir

Research output: Chapter or section in a book/report/conference proceedingChapter in a published conference proceeding

24 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

We define choice logic programs as negation-free datalog programs that allow rules to have exclusive-only disjunctions in the head. We show that choice programs are equivalent to semi-negative datalog programs, at least as far as stable models are concerned. We also discuss an application where strategic games can be naturally formulated as choice programs; it turns out that the stable models of such programs capture exactly the set of Nash equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputer Science Logic - 13th International Workshop, CSL 1999 - 8th Annual Conference of the EACSL, Proceedings
EditorsJörg Flum, Mario Rodriguez-Artalejo
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages266-276
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9783540481683
ISBN (Print)9783540665366
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 13 May 2003
Event13th International Workshop on Computer Science Logic, CSL 1999 and held as International Workshops on Computer Science Logic, EACSL 1999 - Madrid, Spain
Duration: 20 Sept 199925 Sept 1999

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume1683
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference13th International Workshop on Computer Science Logic, CSL 1999 and held as International Workshops on Computer Science Logic, EACSL 1999
Country/TerritorySpain
CityMadrid
Period20/09/9925/09/99

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999.

Keywords

  • Choice
  • Game theory
  • Logic programs
  • Nondeterminism
  • Stable model semantics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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