Can rational stubbornness explain forecast biases?

B Deschamps, C. Ioannidis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines whether the rational jumpiness/stubbornness hypothesis can explain forecast biases. Using a dataset of professional GDP forecasts for the G7 countries over the period 1989-2010, we find evidence supporting the rational stubbornness hypothesis. Specifically, forecasters underreact more when large forecast revisions are highly indicative of low forecast ability. Underreaction is less likely when the size of forecast revisions is unrelated to ability. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that forecasters choose to smooth GDP forecasts to maximize their perceived ability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)141-151
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume92
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2013

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Forecast bias
Forecast revisions
G-7 countries
Underreaction

Cite this

Can rational stubbornness explain forecast biases? / Deschamps, B; Ioannidis, C.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 92, 08.2013, p. 141-151.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Deschamps, B ; Ioannidis, C. / Can rational stubbornness explain forecast biases?. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2013 ; Vol. 92. pp. 141-151.
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