Buying supermajorities in the lab

Sebastian Fehrler, Maik T. Schneider

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative-lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to legislators' preferences and the lobbies' willingness-to-pay. Many of these results carry over to the simultaneous-move set-up but the predictive power of the model declines.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)113-154
Number of pages42
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume127
Early online date15 Feb 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2021

Keywords

  • Colonel Blotto
  • Experimental political economy
  • Legislative lobbying
  • Multi-battlefield contests
  • Vote-buying

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this