Budget deficits and social protection: Cyclical government expenditure in the OECD

Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

  • 3 Citations

Abstract

Countercyclical government spending offers social protection to the vulnerable when economies move into recession. This paper questions the extent to which governments are able to spend countercyclically and the extent to which social expenditures are likely to be countercyclical. An analysis of public spending in OECD countries (1980–2005) suggests countercyclical social protection is constrained by the limits to public borrowing and the degree of political polarization.
LanguageEnglish
Pages909-911
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume117
Issue number3
Early online date30 Jun 2012
DOIs
StatusPublished - Dec 2012

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Social protection
Government expenditure
Budget deficits
Government spending
Public spending
Recession
Polarization
Borrowing
OECD countries
Government
Expenditure

Cite this

Budget deficits and social protection: Cyclical government expenditure in the OECD. / Abbott, Andrew; Jones, Philip.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 117, No. 3, 12.2012, p. 909-911.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abbott, A & Jones, P 2012, 'Budget deficits and social protection: Cyclical government expenditure in the OECD' Economics Letters, vol. 117, no. 3, pp. 909-911. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.011
Abbott A, Jones P. Budget deficits and social protection: Cyclical government expenditure in the OECD. Economics Letters. 2012 Dec;117(3):909-911. Available from, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.011
Abbott, Andrew ; Jones, Philip. / Budget deficits and social protection: Cyclical government expenditure in the OECD. In: Economics Letters. 2012 ; Vol. 117, No. 3. pp. 909-911
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