Abstract

This paper studies the moral dilemma of bribery in the presence of official discretion. Themoral dilemma is framed as a dynamic choice problem in which an official’s present biasedtemptation preferences that value bribery conflict with commitment preferences that place morevalue on honesty. The tension between temptation and commitment becomes salient in thepresence of the official’s discretionary power. More discretion allows the official to lower red-tapewhich is socially beneficial, but it also makes bribery more tempting thereby making commitmentto honesty more costly. Accordingly, a morally committed bureaucrat may choose less discretion(which generates more red-tape) as a remedy to avoid being tempted by bribery. Whereas, thewelfare maximizing policy will often impose high discretion, which generates psychic temptationcosts on honest officials.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)641-655
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume224
Early online date2 Jul 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 Aug 2024

Data Availability Statement

No data was used for the research described in the article.

Keywords

  • Bribery
  • Commitment
  • Discretion
  • Temptation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Bribery and Temptation: More Red Tape or More Discretion'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this