Abstract
Why are people surprised at racial bias feedback, such as test results from Implicit Association Tests (IATs), even though they can predict their IAT racial bias scores prospectively? The present research tested three hypotheses: People are surprised at racial bias feedback due to (1) the feedback wording, (2) implicit
evaluations often being preconscious and unattended, or because (3) pretending to be surprised at racial bias feedback is socially desirable. One pilot, four preregistered studies, and a mini-meta-analysis supported hypothesis (2): Although racial biases such as those reflected on IAT scores are observable, people rarely pay attention to them. Specifically, predicting IAT results (Studies 2-4b) and encouragement to pay attention to one’s biased reactions before IAT completion (Study 3) reduced surprise, independent of explanation of “implicit bias” (Study 4b). Contradicting the social-desirability hypothesis (3), neither encouragement to admit to bias in the form of abstract predictions (Study 3), nor non-threatening explanations of implicit bias (Study 4b), reduced surprise in the absence of encouragement to pay attention to one’s own biases. Speaking against hypothesis (1), surprise was independent of feedback severity (Studies 1–3); and the prediction effect was mediated by recognition of bias, but not correspondence of predictions and feedback (Study 3). These studies suggest that surprise is a consequence of the preconscious nature of automatic social cognitions: People may be motivated to keep consciously accessible racial biases out of awareness. Implications for theories of implicit social cognition and the generality of these effects beyond research on implicit bias are discussed.
evaluations often being preconscious and unattended, or because (3) pretending to be surprised at racial bias feedback is socially desirable. One pilot, four preregistered studies, and a mini-meta-analysis supported hypothesis (2): Although racial biases such as those reflected on IAT scores are observable, people rarely pay attention to them. Specifically, predicting IAT results (Studies 2-4b) and encouragement to pay attention to one’s biased reactions before IAT completion (Study 3) reduced surprise, independent of explanation of “implicit bias” (Study 4b). Contradicting the social-desirability hypothesis (3), neither encouragement to admit to bias in the form of abstract predictions (Study 3), nor non-threatening explanations of implicit bias (Study 4b), reduced surprise in the absence of encouragement to pay attention to one’s own biases. Speaking against hypothesis (1), surprise was independent of feedback severity (Studies 1–3); and the prediction effect was mediated by recognition of bias, but not correspondence of predictions and feedback (Study 3). These studies suggest that surprise is a consequence of the preconscious nature of automatic social cognitions: People may be motivated to keep consciously accessible racial biases out of awareness. Implications for theories of implicit social cognition and the generality of these effects beyond research on implicit bias are discussed.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 104374 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |
Volume | 102 |
Early online date | 21 Jun 2022 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Sept 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the German Research Society (Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft, DFG) awarded to Adam Hahn ( HA 8167/2-1 “Self-Insight into Attitudes: Distinguishing Introspective from Social Self-Awareness in Research on Implicit Evaluations”).
Keywords
- Attitudes
- IAT
- Implicit bias
- Preconscious
- Unconscious
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Psychology
- Sociology and Political Science