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Asymmetric Information and R&D Disclosure: Evidence from Scientific Publications

  • Stefano Baruffaldi
  • , Markus Simeth
  • , David Wehrheim
  • Copenhagen Business School
  • Public University of Navarra

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

We examine how asymmetric information in financial markets affects voluntary research and development (R&D) disclosure, considering scientific publications as a disclosure channel. Difference-in-differences regressions around brokerage house mergers and closures, which increase information asymmetry through reductions in analyst coverage, indicate a quick and sustained increase in scientific publications from treated firms relative to the number of publications from control firms. The treatment effects are concentrated among firms with higher information asymmetry and lower investor demand, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms with lower proprietary costs. We do not find evidence of changes in financial disclosure, nor do we find changes in patenting. Results from ordinary least squares regressions show that scientific publications by firms are positively associated with investor attention toward those firms. We complement these results with qualitative evidence from conference calls. Our results highlight the limitations and trade-offs R&D firms face in their financial market disclosure policies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1052-1069
Number of pages18
JournalManagement Science
Volume70
Issue number2
Early online date23 Mar 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Feb 2024

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Brian Bushee (the editor), the associate editor, the two referees, Benjamin Balsmeier, Iv´an Blanco, Bruno Cassi-man, Miguel Duro, Jose Mar´ıa Flores, Igor Kadach, Bastian Krieger, Johannes Luger, Eduardo Melero, Ali Mohammadi, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Maikel Pellens, Neus Palomeras, Andrea Patacconi, Thomas Rønde, Valentina Tartari, and Giovanni Valentini as well as the workshop participants at the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum (2019), University of Luxembourg (2019), CUNEF(2020), EPFL (2020), ESADE (2020), IESE Business School (2020),Annual Conference of the EPIP Association (2021), Annual Meeting of the Spanish Finance Association (2021), EARIE Annual Conference (2021), Eu-SPRI Conference (2021), Norwich Business School (2021), SEI Faculty Workshop (2021),UNU-MERIT (2021), ZEW Mannheim (2021), and the Strategy Science Conference (2022) for their helpful comments and suggestions. The authors also thank Peter Cziraki and Moqi Groen-Xu for sharing the data on CEO employment contracts. The authors are listed in alphabetical order

Funding

This work was supported by the Danish Independent Research Fund [Grant 0133-00119B] andthe Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities [Grant PGC2018-094418-B-I00].

FundersFunder number
Danish Independent Research Fund0133-00119B
Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y UniversidadesPGC2018-094418-B-I00

    Keywords

    • financial analysts
    • information asymmetry
    • investor attention
    • R&D disclosure
    • scientific publications

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Strategy and Management
    • Management Science and Operations Research

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