Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives?

long-term incentive plans

Alexander Pepper, Julie Gore, Alf Crossman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Research on senior executive reward has typically explored the connection between pay, performance and the alignment of interests of executives and shareholders. This article examines the relationship between reward and motivation, drawing on the psychological, behavioural economics and decision-making literatures. Based on an empirical study of FTSE 350 senior executives, the research examines whether long-term incentive plans are an effective and efficient way of motivating executives, taking into account risk, time discounting, uncertainty and fairness. The article concludes that the way executives frame choices, perceive value, assess probability, evaluate temporal effects and respond to uncertainty means that long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are generally not efficient and are often not effective in meeting their objectives. It proposes that, in its current form, agency theory does not provide a sound basis for modelling senior executive reward, and suggests five areas for development.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)36-51
JournalHuman Resource Management Journal
Volume23
Issue number1
Early online date3 Jan 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013

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Incentives
Reward
Uncertainty
Empirical study
Performance pay
Shareholders
Discounting
Alignment
Decision making
Agency theory
Fairness
Psychological
Modeling

Cite this

Are long-term incentive plans an effective and efficient way of motivating senior executives? long-term incentive plans. / Pepper, Alexander; Gore, Julie; Crossman, Alf.

In: Human Resource Management Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, 01.2013, p. 36-51.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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