An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

Subhasish Chowdhury, Roman Sheremeta, Dan Kovenock

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy that stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications
LanguageEnglish
Pages833-861
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume52
Issue number3
DOIs
StatusPublished - 2013

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Prediction
Deviation
Warfare
Lottery
Auctions

Cite this

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games. / Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman; Kovenock, Dan.

In: Economic Theory, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2013, p. 833-861.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chowdhury, S, Sheremeta, R & Kovenock, D 2013, 'An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games' Economic Theory, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 833-861. DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0670-2
Chowdhury S, Sheremeta R, Kovenock D. An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games. Economic Theory. 2013;52(3):833-861. Available from, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0670-2
Chowdhury, Subhasish ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Kovenock, Dan. / An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games. In: Economic Theory. 2013 ; Vol. 52, No. 3. pp. 833-861
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