An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements

M Finus, M Elena Saiz, Eligius M T Hendrix

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)117-137
Number of pages21
JournalEnvironment and Development Economics
Volume14
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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