TY - JOUR
T1 - An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements
AU - Finus, M
AU - Saiz, M Elena
AU - Hendrix, Eligius M T
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.
AB - We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67749145285&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X08004634
U2 - 10.1017/S1355770X08004634
DO - 10.1017/S1355770X08004634
M3 - Article
SN - 1355-770X
VL - 14
SP - 117
EP - 137
JO - Environment and Development Economics
JF - Environment and Development Economics
IS - 1
ER -