'All for one and one for all': Transactions cost and collective action

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile 'profits' (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is 'non-profit' enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low-cost signals relating to process. There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed 'non-profit' and a common goal is non-rival.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)450-468
Number of pages19
JournalPolitical Studies
Volume52
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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transaction costs
collective behavior
cause
incentive
Group
stimulus
profit
participation
costs

Cite this

'All for one and one for all': Transactions cost and collective action. / Jones, P.

In: Political Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2004, p. 450-468.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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