Aid, poverty reduction and the 'new conditionality'

P Mosley, J Hudson, A Verschoor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

136 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper examines the effect of aid on poverty, rather than on economic growth. We devise a 'pro-poor (public) expenditure index', and present evidence that, together with inequality and corruption, this is a key determinant of the aid's poverty leverage. After presenting empirical evidence which suggests a positive leverage of aid donors on pro-poor expenditure, we argue for the development of conditionality in a new form, which gives greater flexibility to donors in punishing slippage on previous commitments, and keys aid disbursements to performance in respect of policy variables which governments can influence in a pro-poor direction.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)F217-F243
JournalThe Economic journal
Volume114
Issue number496
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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Poverty reduction
Conditionality
Leverage
Poverty
Slippage
Corruption
Empirical evidence
Public expenditure
Government
Economic growth
Expenditure

Cite this

Mosley, P., Hudson, J., & Verschoor, A. (2004). Aid, poverty reduction and the 'new conditionality'. The Economic journal, 114(496), F217-F243.

Aid, poverty reduction and the 'new conditionality'. / Mosley, P; Hudson, J; Verschoor, A.

In: The Economic journal, Vol. 114, No. 496, 2004, p. F217-F243.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Mosley, P, Hudson, J & Verschoor, A 2004, 'Aid, poverty reduction and the 'new conditionality'', The Economic journal, vol. 114, no. 496, pp. F217-F243.
Mosley P, Hudson J, Verschoor A. Aid, poverty reduction and the 'new conditionality'. The Economic journal. 2004;114(496):F217-F243.
Mosley, P ; Hudson, J ; Verschoor, A. / Aid, poverty reduction and the 'new conditionality'. In: The Economic journal. 2004 ; Vol. 114, No. 496. pp. F217-F243.
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