A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

S Nandeibam

doi:10.1007/s10058-003-0103-1

A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

S Nandeibam

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Abstract

We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	293-299
Number of pages	7
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-003-0103-1
Publication status	Published - 2003

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abstract = "We show that Barber{\'a} and Sonnenschein{\textquoteright}s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow{\textquoteright}s theorem",

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AB - We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem

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JO - Review of Economic Design

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ER -

A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

Abstract

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