A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)293-299
Number of pages7
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

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Monotonicity
Social preferences
Additivity

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A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference. / Nandeibam, S.

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 8, 2003, p. 293-299.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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