A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions

Shasikanta Nandeibam

doi:10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5

A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions

Shasikanta Nandeibam

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Abstract

This note sharpens the result of Nandeibam (J Econ Theory 68:212-233, 1996). We show that a stochastic social choice function which satisfies regularity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak ex-post Pareto optimality is essentially a weak random dictatorship.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	447-455
Number of pages	9
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	30
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5
Publication status	Published - Apr 2008

Keywords

Committees
Social Choice
Clubs
Associations (D710)

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10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5

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title = "A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions",

abstract = "This note sharpens the result of Nandeibam (J Econ Theory 68:212-233, 1996). We show that a stochastic social choice function which satisfies regularity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak ex-post Pareto optimality is essentially a weak random dictatorship.",

keywords = "Committees, Social Choice, Clubs, Associations (D710)",

author = "Shasikanta Nandeibam",

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KW - Committees

KW - Social Choice

KW - Clubs

KW - Associations (D710)

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UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5

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DO - 10.1007/s00355-007-0240-5

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JO - Social Choice and Welfare

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IS - 3

ER -

A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions

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Keywords

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