A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions

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Abstract

This note sharpens the result of Nandeibam (J Econ Theory 68:212-233, 1996). We show that a stochastic social choice function which satisfies regularity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak ex-post Pareto optimality is essentially a weak random dictatorship.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)447-455
Number of pages9
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume30
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2008

Keywords

  • Committees
  • Social Choice
  • Clubs
  • Associations (D710)

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