A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed Control of Thermostatic Loads Acting in Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets

Antonio De Paola, Vincenzo Trovato, David Angeli, Goran Strbac

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Abstract

This paper proposes a novel distributed solution for the operation of large populations of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) providing frequency support. A game-theory framework is adopted, modelling the TCLs as price-responsive rational agents that schedule their energy consumption and allocate frequency response provision in order to minimize their operational costs. The novelty of this work lies in the use of mean field games to abstract the complex interactions of large numbers of TCLs with the grid and in the introduction of an innovative market structure, envisioning distinct price signals for electricity and response. Differently from previous approaches, such prices are not designed ad hoc but are derived instead from an underlying system scheduling model.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5987-5999
Number of pages1
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Volume10
Issue number6
Early online date24 Jan 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 24 Jan 2019

Cite this

A Mean Field Game Approach for Distributed Control of Thermostatic Loads Acting in Simultaneous Energy-Frequency Response Markets. / De Paola, Antonio; Trovato, Vincenzo; Angeli, David; Strbac, Goran.

In: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Vol. 10, No. 6, 30.11.2019, p. 5987-5999.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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