Abstract
This paper proposes a novel distributed solution for the operation of large populations of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) providing frequency support. A game-theory framework is adopted, modeling the TCLs as price-responsive rational agents that schedule their energy consumption and allocate frequency response provision in order to minimize their operational costs. The novelty of this work lies in the use of mean field games to abstract the complex interactions of large numbers of TCLs with the grid and in the introduction of an innovative market structure, envisioning distinct price signals for electricity and response. Differently from previous approaches, such prices are not designed ad hoc but are derived instead from an underlying system scheduling model.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 8625448 |
Pages (from-to) | 5987-5999 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid |
Volume | 10 |
Issue number | 6 |
Early online date | 24 Jan 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Nov 2019 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Manuscript received September 13, 2018; revised December 18, 2018; accepted January 17, 2019. Date of publication January 24, 2019; date of current version October 30, 2019. This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust under Grant ECF-2016-394. Paper no. TSG-01344-2018. (Corresponding author: Antonio De Paola.) A. De Paola is with the Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, U.K. (e-mail: [email protected]).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2010-2012 IEEE.
Keywords
- Game theory
- distributed control
- load management
- power system control
- thermal energy storage
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Computer Science