TY - JOUR
T1 - A Canonical Model for Interactive Unawareness
AU - Meier, Martin
AU - Heifetz, Aviad
AU - Schipper, Burkhard
PY - 2008/1/1
Y1 - 2008/1/1
N2 - Heifetz, Meier and Schipper [Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006a. Interactive unawareness, J. Econ. Theory 130, 78–94; Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006b. Unawareness, beliefs and games. Mimeo] introduced unawareness structures. These are generalized state-space models that allow for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that a canonical unawareness structure arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of formulas in an appropriate axiom system. As a corollary, we obtain a strong soundness and completeness theorem for this axiom system with respect to the class of unawareness structures.
AB - Heifetz, Meier and Schipper [Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006a. Interactive unawareness, J. Econ. Theory 130, 78–94; Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006b. Unawareness, beliefs and games. Mimeo] introduced unawareness structures. These are generalized state-space models that allow for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that a canonical unawareness structure arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of formulas in an appropriate axiom system. As a corollary, we obtain a strong soundness and completeness theorem for this axiom system with respect to the class of unawareness structures.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/37849017123
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.003
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.003
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 62
SP - 304
EP - 324
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -