A Canonical Model for Interactive Unawareness

Martin Meier; Aviad  Heifetz; Burkhard  Schipper

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.003

A Canonical Model for Interactive Unawareness

Martin Meier, Aviad Heifetz, Burkhard Schipper

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

66 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

Heifetz, Meier and Schipper [Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006a. Interactive unawareness, J. Econ. Theory 130, 78–94; Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006b. Unawareness, beliefs and games. Mimeo] introduced unawareness structures. These are generalized state-space models that allow for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that a canonical unawareness structure arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of formulas in an appropriate axiom system. As a corollary, we obtain a strong soundness and completeness theorem for this axiom system with respect to the class of unawareness structures.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	304-324
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	62
Issue number	1
Early online date	30 Aug 2007
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.003
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2008

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abstract = "Heifetz, Meier and Schipper [Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006a. Interactive unawareness, J. Econ. Theory 130, 78–94; Heifetz, A., Meier, M., Schipper, B.C., 2006b. Unawareness, beliefs and games. Mimeo] introduced unawareness structures. These are generalized state-space models that allow for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that a canonical unawareness structure arises naturally if states consist of maximally consistent sets of formulas in an appropriate axiom system. As a corollary, we obtain a strong soundness and completeness theorem for this axiom system with respect to the class of unawareness structures.",

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A Canonical Model for Interactive Unawareness

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